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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
PATRICIA M. BURNHAM,
Pwintiff and
Appellant,
vs.
BANKERS LIFE &
CASUALTY COMPANY,
)
an Illinois corporation,
Defendant and
Respondent.

Case No.
11924

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action commenced by Mrs. Patricia
M. Burnham seeking recovery on a reinstated life
insurance policy issued by defendant, Bankers Life
& Casualty Company, to her husband, Dr. Preston
J. Burnham, deceased.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The court below granted defendant's Motion For
Summary Judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the Summary
Judgment granted by the District Court below. ·1

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 21, 1962, Bankers Life & Casualty
Company issued to Dr. Preston J. Burnham a $10,000.00 whole life insurance policy with a $40,000.00
fifteen year decreasing term rider attached thereto.
On April 1, 1967, the term rider lapsed due to
failure to pay premiums, however, the basic $10,000.00 policy continued in force past the date of Dr.
Burnham's suicide, being supported by premium payments from cash reserves.
During the period of time from February 13,
1963, to November 9, 1965, Dr. Preston J. Burnham
and his wife, the plaintiff, herein, consulted with Dr.
Herbert B. Fowler, a doctor of psychiatry at the University Medical School, regarding marital problems.
During that three year period Dr. Burnham, either
alone or in company with his wife, saw Dr. Fowler
in his professional capacity a total of 80 times; 31
times in 1963, 19 times in 1964 and 30 times in 1965
(Dep. Dr. Herbert B. Fowler, p. 11).
Dr. Fowler claimed that the consultations were
for marital counseling only and that there was no psychotherapy given and there was no medication administered (Dep. Dr. Fowler, pp. 18-19). Dr. Fowler further claimed that the counseling he gave might
have been given by a professional marriage counselor
( Dep. Dr. Fowler, p. 35), and noted that physicians
with marital problems generally tend to seek out
2

other medical doctors for advice ( Dep. Dr. Fowler,
p. 33).
Dr. Fowler noted that Dr. Burnham was subject
to mood swings and that at times the doctor's mood
shifted alternatively from depression to elation ( Dep.
Dr. Fowler, p. 21). During the periods of depression
Dr. Burnham would say, "I wish I were dead" or "I
would be better off dead" (Dep. Dr. Fowler, p. 24).
Dr. Fowler indicated that although this reaction is
standard for people having severe conflicts, the suicidal expressions are real and are not given in a hum01·ous vein (Dep. Dr. Fowler, p. 38). Dr. Fowler further stated that even though Dr. Burnham had expressed to him ideas such that he wished he was dead,
he (Dr. Fowler) did not consider these expressions
serious; rather he considered them quite normal for
persons in the marital si'tuation of Dr. Burnham
(Dep. Dr. Fowler, pp. 24-27) and that had he considered such expressions serious he would have hospitalized Dr. Burnham (Dep. Dr. Fowler, p. 26). Dr.
Fowler did note, however, that although persons making such suicidal expressions generally do not commit suicide, the pressures causing the outburst of
suicidal threats could lead to suicide (Dep. Dr. Fowler, p. 25).
Dr. Fowler further tes'tified that although a
trained and experienced marriage counselor could
have engaged in the same type of consultation that
he, himself, had engaged in with Dr. Burnham (Dep.
Dr. Fowler, p. 35), because of his more extensive
3

training he would be of more help, particularly when
dealing with a fellow physician. (Dep. Dr. Fowler,
p. 37).
Dr. Fowler also indicated that when people express suicidal threats the judgment as to the seriousness of the threats is a value judgment to be made by
the consulting psychiatrist. (Dep. Dr. Fowler, p. 38).
Wrong judgments do occur, and patients not believed
suicidal do in fact commit suicide (Dep. Dr. Fowler,
p. 38).
On February 20, 1968, Dr. Preston J. Burnham
did in fact commit suicide by sell inflicted gunshot.
On June 28, 1967, Dr. Burnham applied for reinstatement of the $10,000.00 face policy, accompanied by the term rider. An application for policy reinstatement was filled out and certain reinstatement
questions were asked, among them the following:
State every physician or practitioner
whom you have consulted or who has treated
you during the past five years: (If none, so
state)"
Dr. Burnham failed to list Dr. Herbert B. Fowler as
a physician with whom he had consulted prior to applying for reinstatement of his insurance policy, despite the over 80 visits made by Dr. Burnham to Dr.
Fowler during the period of consultation.
On July 21, 1967, defendant, Bankers Life &
Casualty Company relying on the Answers given in
the reinstatement application, accepted the premiums
4

and reinstated the insurance policy. On February 20,
1968, Dr. Burnham died of apparent suicide. On Jan ..
uary 9, 1969, formal demand for payment was made
upon the insurance company and it refused to pay
the $30,440.00 claimed due under the decreasing
term rider. The $10,000.00 whole life policy, however,
was paid and the premiums applied to the decreasing
term rider were returned without prejudice to the
plaintiff's right to bring this action.
Defendant, Banker Life & Casualty, moved for
a Summary Judgment based on the pleadings; an
Affidavit by Don J. Hanson, attorney for Bankers
Life & Casualty; and the depositions of Dr. Herbert
B. Fowler and Mrs. Patricia M. Burnham, wife of
the decedent and the plaintiff in this action. The
District Court granted the Motion based on the failure of Dr. Burnham to reveal information material
to the risk.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE LOWER OOURT DID NOT ERR IN
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT, BANKERS LIFE & CASUALTY
COMPANY.

The District Court below properly framed the
issue before it as follows:
"The governing issue presented to the
court seems to be whether upon request by de5

cedent that his life insurance policy be reinstated, his failure to disclose numerous visits
to Dr. Fowler constituted a fraud upon the insurance company."
That court held, with regard to the above framed
issue, as follows :

"It is the view of the court that Dr. Burnham's failure to disclose prevented the insurer
from exercising its right to evaluate what it
might have learned from Dr. Fowler and to
apply the restriction to the reinstated policy,
and that this failure to disclose was a misrepresentation by omission and a fraud upon the
insurer. Accordingly, defendant's Motion For
Summary Judgment will be granted."
In reaching its decision that the misrepresentation by omission of important psychiatric consultations amounted to a fraud on the insurance company
and, therefore, justified as a matter of law the Summary Judgment sought by defendant insurer, the
court was clearly supported by the general rule of
law in this and a majority of jurisdictions. That rule
provides generally that
" ... A material false representation is a
ground for the avoidance of an insurance policy ... " 43 Am. Jur. 2d, Insurance, Sec. 735,
p. 721
The materiality of a false statement in an insurance policy application is generally determined by the
following test:
" ... If the knowledge of a consultation
6

with a physician for a certain ailment would
have led a reasonably prudent insurer to decline the application, a false statement by the
applicant which in effect conceals from the insurer the knowledge that the applicant had
such consultation is material to the risk, otherwise it is not." 43 Am. Jur. 2d, Insurance, Sec.
792, pp, 776-777.
This court has articulated the above test in the
following cases: Prudential Insurance Company of
American vs. Johnson, 22 Utah 2d 66, 448 P. 2d 722
( 1968) ; Chadwick vs. Beneficial Life Insurance
Company, 56 Utah 480, 191 P. 240 (1920).
In Prudential the defendant counterclaimed for
benefits under a policy in an action to cancel an insurance policy by the insurer. The Supreme Court
held that the incontestable clause of the policies previously held by the insured did not continue in effect
with respect to fraud in the application for successor
policies which contain no incontestable clauses. The
case sets out the generally accepted rule of materiality
and noted that falsity of an insured's answers in applying for a life insurance policy in that the insured
had consulted a doctor on 'five occasions and that the
doctor had diagnosed his trouble as heart failure and
prescribed digitalis and rest and even suggested surgery, amounted to fraud, invalidating the policy.
In Chadwick the evidence showed that the insured had been a rancher by occupation and was strong
and vigorous until on or about February 1, 1916,
7

when he became afflicted with some malady causing
him pain in his back. He sought treatment for the
malady and also made application for a life insurance
policy 'to the defendant, on which application he failed to answer a number of questions regarding his
state of health and diseases which he had contracted.
Among those questions was one which asked him to
give the name and address of the physician last consulted to which he answered "none". The court reversed a jury verdict for the plaintiff and directed the
entry of a verdict for the defendant saying:
"If the insured at the time of making his
application for a policy has knowledge or good
reason to know that he is afflicted with a disease that renders his condition serious and
that thereby his longevity will be prejudicially
impaired, his statements and representations
to the contrary in reply to specific inquiries
constitute a fraud practiced upon the insurer
and which when successfully proven invalidates the policy." 191 P. at 245.
Other cases supporting respondent's position include McDonald vs. Northern Ben. Association, 131
P. 2d 479 (1942 Montana) and American National
Insurance Company vs. Caldwell, 70 Ariz. 78, 216 P.
2d 413 (1950 Arizona). In the McDonald case an application for a life insurance policy included the question of whether or not the applicant had ever consulted a physician for any other diseases or disability
named including high blood pressure. The applicant
answered "no" and further answered in the negative
8

the question as to whether or not he had consulted a
doctor for any cause within the last five years. He
answered in the affirmative questions as to his good
health and freedom from disease. The court below
rendered a judgment for the plaintiff under a directed verdict, and the defendant appealed. The court
held as a matter of law even under a requirement
that the defendant prove fraud (quoting from a previous Montana case, Par and Bro. vs. Turner, 37
Montana 521, 97 P. 950 ( 1908) :
" ... The concealment of the material fact
is equivalent to a false representation that it
does not exist. We cannot escape the conclusion
that the insured made false statements with
knowledge of their falsity; that the defendant
accepted his representations as true, acted
upon them, and was prejudiced ... The evidence upon this feature of the case being uncontradicted and it being possible to draw only
one inference from it there is presented a question of law for the court and not a question of
fact for the jury. The fraud being conclusively
established, the evidence was insufficient to
sustain a verdict in favor of the plaintiff."
(Emphasis added).
The case then was reversed and remanded with directions to enter judgment in favor of the defendant.
In American National Insurance Company, the
jury returned a verdict of $1,000 for the plaintiff in
an action on a policy of life insurance issued on the
life of the deceased. Defendant had denied liability
on the grounds that deceased knowingly made material misrepresentations of the facts in his application
9

for the insurance. There was no question that the deceased had not disclosed to the defendant that he had
a duodenal ulcer at the time of the application. The
only question was, did he know that he was afflicted
with such an ulcer? The evidence showed that a doctor
had made an examination of the deceased prior to
his death and had gone over the x-rays with him and
informed him of his findings - that he had a duodenal ulcer. The trial court instructed the jury to answer interrogatories as to whether the deceased had
knowledge that he had been treated for such an ulcer
prior to his application to the defendant. The jury
answered the interrogatories "no" and found for the
plaintiff. The court reversed the jury's finding and
said:
"The law is well settled in this state that
failure to disclose material facts with no intent to deceive in an application for a life insurance policy where the insured knew of those
facts at the time of his application constitutes
legal fraud and voids the policy."
Appellant attempts to avoid the application of
the general rule regarding misrepresentation in an
insurance application by drawing a dichotomy between fraud and misrepresentation. Such a severance
is of little persuasion when on the facts of the case
before this court there was clear failure to answer a
question vital to the respondent's acceptance of the
insurance risk. It is obvious that when such information as psychiatric visits to a licensed psychiatrist at
which suicidal exclamations were heard is omitted,
10

a clear misrepresentation has occurred and in the
words of the lower court"creates a fraud on the insurance company". Since the insurance company has
been deprived of its right to know what physicians
the deceased has consulted and for what reasons, by
simple logic it follows that when an applicant fails to
disclose facts which would materially affect the risk,
fraud has been committed.
Utah by statutes among numerous other jurisdictions, has indicated its adherence to the rule that
intent is unnecessary to establish misrepresentation
and fraud in insurance policy applications and reinstatement situations. Utah Code Ann. 31-19-8 (1953)
regarding representations in applications puts Utah
in line with the majority of states providing that the
insurer need not prove fraud or intent to deceive but
only that the misrepresentations were material to the
acceptance of the risk or to the hazards assumed by
the insurer.
Utah Code Annotated (1953) Section 31-19-8,
provides:
"Representations in applications. - (1)
All statements and descriptions in any application for an insurance policy or annuity contract, or for the reinstatement or renewal
thereof, by or in behalf of the insured or annuitant, shall be deemed to be representations and
not warranties. Misrepresentations, om issions, concealment of facts, and incorrect statements shall not prevent a recovery under the
policy or contract unless:
(a) fradulent; or
11

(b) material either to the acceptance of
the rwk, or to the hazard assumed by the insurer; or

( c) the insurer in good faith either would
not have issued the policy or contract, or would
not have issued, reinstated or renewed it at the
same premium rate, or would not have issued,
reinstated, or renewed a policy or contract in
as large an amount, or would not have provided coverage with respect to the hazard resulting in the loss, if the true facts had been made
known to the insurer as required either by the
aI?plication for the policy or contract or otherwise.
( 2) If, in any action to rescind any policy or contract or to recover thereon, any misrepresentation with respect to a medical impairment is proved by the insurer, and the insured or any other person having or claiming
a right under the contract shall prevent full
disclosure and proof of the nature of the medical impairment, the misrepresentation shall be
presumed to have been material."

There is in Utah Code Annotated, Section 31-198 ( 1953), no requirement of intent to deceive.
Although Utah has no cases dealing precisely
with this issue, other jurisdictions have articulated
the rule clearly. In Anaheim Builders Supply, Inc. vs.
Lincoln National Life Insurance Company, 43 Cal.
Rep. 494 ( 1965), it was held that false representations or concealments of fact whether intentional or
unintentional which were material to the risk, vitiates the life policy, and the presence of an intent to
12

deceive is not essential. In line with the above reasoning, All Amer. Life & Casualty Company vs. Krenzelok, 409 P. 2d 766 (Wyoming, 1966), held that
fraudulent intent on the part of the insured is not a
requisite of a concealment defense to a life insurance
policy. See also Rael vs. American Estate Life Insurance Company, 79 N.M. 379, 444 P. 2d 290 (1968),
where it was held that if misrepresentations are
made or information is withheld and the misrepresentations or information is material to the policy, it
makes no difference whether the party acted fraudulently, negligently or innocently, accord see Prudential Insurance Company of America vs. Anaya,
78 N.M. 101,428 P. 2d 640 ( 1967).
In Wissner vs. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company, 395 F. 2d 204 (1968), it was held that
fraud or bad faith is not necessary to invalidate a
policy for material misrepresentation, omission or
concealment of the policy application. Accord see
Thomas-Yelverton Company vs. State Capitol Life
Insurance Company, 238 N.C. 278, 77 S.E. 2d. 692
(1953).
The above authorities provide ample support to
render appellant's dichotomization of fraud and misrepresentation invalid.
The effectiveness and validity of the defendant
insurance company's position regarding material
misrepresentations was mirrored further in the opinion of the lower court where it was pointed out that
under Utah Code Annotated, Section 31-22-18
13

(Amend. 1953) ci'ted Infra at p. 25. Bankers Life &
Casualty may well have had the power to exclude the
policy on suicide clause grounds as well, in that a man
who evidences suicidal tendencies is not a good insurance risk whether seeking an original or a reinstatement policy. The obviousness of that conclusion is
illustrated by the inclusion in most insurance policies
of a standard suicide clause.
The court's treatment of the suicide clause under the code serves to clearly illustrate the validity of
the material misrepresentation rule and the court's
holding. The appellant argues that because the lower
court commented on the power defendant insurance
company had to set suicide clause standards and force
the reinstated policy to begin the suicide clause exemption running anew that they were in some way
prejudiced. The argument suffers in light of the clear
holding of the lower court which held:
"Disclosure by the insured of the numerous
visits to Dr. Fowler would have enabled the
insurer to evaluate what they might have
learned from Dr. Fowler bearing upon the option to insert again the two year contestability
restriction in connection with the death due to
suicide."
Reference by the judge to the suicide clause provision serves only to illustrate and emphasize the material misrepresentation defense asserted by the respondent Bankers Life & Casualty Company. There
was clearly no abridgement of the Appellant's rights
by the Lower Court and Respondent was entitled to
a Summary Judgment as a matter of law, no triable
1
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issue of law or fact having been raised by the Appellant at trial. The doctor's 'failure to fully answer
tions as to his visit to physicians clearly prejudiced
the insurance company and amounted to a material
misrepresentation and a fraud upon the insurer.
Respondent submits that the court can take judicial notice that if a "reasonably prudent insurer"
as set out in the test, Supra, at p. 7, had received information that a prospective insured had visited a
psychiatrist eighty times in a three-year period and
had on a number of those visits expressed suicidal
tendencies in verbal form to the psychiatrist, that
such insurance company acting reasonably and prudently would not have accepted the risk. Don J.
son's Affidavit to that effect is competent to assert
that such action would have been taken by Bankers
Life & Casual'ty Company.
POINT II.
THE AFFIDAVIT PRESENTED BY THE DEFENDANT WITH THE OTHER SUPPORTING
EVIDENCE WAS CLEARLY SUFFICIENT UNDER RULE 56 (e), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.

Rule 56 ( e) provides:

" ( e) Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony; Defense Required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would
be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to
testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or
15

certified copies of all papers or parts thereof
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached
thereto or served therewith. The court may
permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for
summary judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party may
not rest upon the mere allegations or denials
of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits
or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond,
summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be
entered against him."
Appellant argues that the Affidavit of Don J.
Hanson, attorney f!or Bankers Life & Casualty Company was irregular and insufficient under the Rule.
An analysis of the Affidavit in 1i g ht of the Rule
should provide clear evidence of its validity.
It is a well established principle of law that a
business entity must of necessity act through its
agents and officers since it cannot act personally. 2
C.J.S. Affidavits, Section 8 articulates the Rule as
follows:

Ordinarily an attorney for a corporation
may make an Affidavit on its behalf under the
same circumstances as would authorize him to
make it for a private person and a statute permitting parties to make Affidavits through
its attorneys or agents applies to corporations,
but under a statute requiring a party to make
the Affidavit, only the corporate officers can
make the Affidavit." (Emphasis added)
16

In accord 3 Am. Jur. 2nd, Affidavits, Section 5,
Page 384 provides:

"It is quite apparent that a corporation is
incapable of taking an oath except through
some individual acting in its behalf. That is
through its officers or agents. Consequently,
it must necessarily be inferred that an officer,
agent or attorney of a corporation may make
a requisite Affidavit in its behalf, even though
the statute regulating the making of Affidavits makes no provision or exception in favor
of corporations." (Emphasis added)
In Re: Ben Weiss, 271 F. 2nd 234 (1959), the
Court cited the above reference to 2 C.J.S., Section 8,
Affidavits, noting 'that it must necessarily be inferred that an officer or agent of a corporation may
make an Affidavit in its behalf even though the statute regulating the making of the Affidavit makes no
provision or exception in favor of corporations.
See also Southern Attractions, Inc. vs. Grau, 93
Southern 2nd 120 (1957) wherein the Court discussed the construction of statutes dealing with Affidavits, and noted at Page 124 of the opinion ...
"The statute in question does not say 'the
party must file an Affidavit signed by himself.
Nor do we believe that the statute requires him
to do so ... "
Then referring to 2 C.J.S.Affidavits the Court
further commented that an attorney may make an
Affidavit for the party if he knows the facts and it is
within the discretion for the Courts to receive the
17

Affidavit of an agent or attorney in situations where
a different construction of the statute might defeat
the ends of justice.
Citing 3 Am. J ur., Affidavits, Section 5:
As counsel for Bankers Life & Casualty Company, Don J. Hanson possessed and included in the
Affidavit all the requisite items necessary for a valid
Rule 56 ( e) Affidavit. He stated in that Affidavit
that he was acting as attorney for the defendant,
Bankers Life & Casualty - that he had investigated
the facts in the case and as the agent for Bankers
Life & Casualty Company was making the Affidavit
on behalf of the defendant. Mr. Hanson then went on
to recite the facts of the case as set out in this Brief,
Supra, indicating the premiums charged for the coverage of the insurance policies involved, face amounts
of the principal policy and the decreasing term rider,
the incidents of lapse under the privilege of the policy
on April, 1967; various other policy clauses regarding renewal, default in premium payment, reinstatement and the application of Preston Burnham for reinstatement of the policy. The Affidavit also included
the reinstatement agreement included in the policy:
'''The applicant hereunder and the company hereby agree that reinstatement of said
policy, as granted by the company at its home
office upon this application, shall be contestable on account of fraud or misrepresentation
in material facts herein stated at any time
within two years from the date of approval
hereof."
18
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The Affidavit then recited the physician, L. Bert
Green, whom Dr. Preston Burnham had consulted as
being the only physician listed on the reinstatement
application. The Affivadit also outlined Dr. Burnhams visits with Dr. Herbert B. Fowler, the number
of these visits and that had the insurance company,
Bankers Life & Casualty, known that Dr. Burnham
had expressed suicidal tendencies to Dr. Fowler, that
the policy of insurance here under consideration
would not have been renewed. The Affidavit then concluded by a restatement of 'the day on which Dr.
Burnham died and indicated the copies of death certificates attached to the Affidavit. The Affidavit
concluded by noting that the principal policy sum
of $10,000.00 had been paid to the beneficiary and
that the premiums in the amount of $427.53 collected
to support the $40,000.00 term rider had been returned and accepted.
Respondent submits that the Affidavit by
Don J. Hanson satisfied in full the requirements o.f
Rule 56 ( e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in
that the Affidavit was made on personal knowledge
setting forth facts that would be admissible in evidence (and which provide the background to this
suit). In the affidavit Mr. Hanson indicated his competence to testify as an agent of Bankers Life & Casualty Company and as a result, the affidavit supported by the other evidence submitted at the time,
was sufficient to sustain the Summary Judgment.
An annotation at 115 ALR 100 indicates that in
19

almost one half of the comparatively few cases involving the admissibility or materiality of misrepresentation 'testimony on the part of officers or employees of
an insurer to the effect that an application would not
have been accepted but for the misrepresentation the courts have geneq1lly held that officers or
employees of insurers are entitled to testify to the effect of such misrepresentation and such testimony
has generally been approved under the particular circumstances of the case.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IN THAT THERE WAS NO MATERIAL ISSUE OF FACT 'TO BE DECIDED AT
TRIAL.

Appellant centers her contention as to triable
issues on whether Dr. Burnham was required to inform the insurance company of his visits to a psychiatrist for marriage counseling and whether the
failure to so inform the company amounted to material misrepresentation and a fraud on the company. It
is Appellant's contention that the issues are jury
questions, while Respondent contends that they are
issues of law for the Court and were properly so
treated by the District Court below.
Appellant further makes extensive reference to
the questions on the reinstatement application arguing that the questions, including No. 6, did not require the deceased to reveal he had been consulting a
psychiatrist.
20

Respondent submits that question No. 6 was designed to prevent precisely what occurred in this case,
namely, misrepresentation by omission. That question reads:
"State every physician or practitioner
whom you have consulted or who has treated
you during the past five years. (If none, so
sta:te. ) "
·
The reason for question No. 6 is obvious and is
illustrated by the following statement from 43 Am.
Jur. 2nd, Insurance, Section 792, Page 776:
"The importance of a false statement by
an applicant for a policy of insurance as to
whether he has consulted physicians lies in the
fact that he conceals from the insurer the fact
of such consultations and thus deprives it of
the opportunity of making an independent investigation and of obtaining further information so as to enable it to decide for itself in the
light of the additional information whether to
enter into the proposed contract or what premium to charge."
See also an Annotation at 131 ALR 617 regarding the materially of false representations in an application for a policy of insurance as to whether the
Appellant has consulted physicians.
The above illustrates the general Rule that an
insurance company before taking on a new insured
or reinstating an old one, has a right to know every
physician who has· treated or consulted that applicant
for whatever reason ..
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It is difficult to believe that a doctor who has
been visited 80 times in his professional capacity as
a psychiatrist would not qualify as a physician under
the general rule. It is clear that had the insurance
company known of the visits to the psychiatrist it
would have at least been able to inquire as to the purpose of the visits. However, because of the failure by
Dr. Burnham to furnish the information it was precluded from doing so. To assert, as does the Appellant, that such consultations refer only to physical
examinations defeats the purpose behind the policy
question, namely 'that of aiding the company in determining whether it wishes to assume the risk of insuring the applicant.
Appellant further takes the position that if the
insurance company had wanted to know about marriage counseling sessions it should have included a
question asking for that type of information. Such
position is unpersuasive in that to require an insurance company to elicit information as to strange and
exotic forms of maladies by precise questions and to
be forced to assume risks with regard to those maladies if precise questions are not directed to them is
an intolerable burden and one clearly unjustified.
Question No. 6 is general in nature for the precise
purpose of forcing an applicant to give information
about all of the physicians whom he has consulted.
Once that information is obtained, the insurance company then is free to investigate and examine the risk
and to accept or reject that risk.
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Had the decedent, Dr. Burnham, answered Question No. 6 truthfully and revealed his visits to a psychiatrist (from whom the company could have learned of his threatened suicide) the policy would not
have been issued. Reasonably prudent insurance companies simply do not accept applicants who make suicidal threats. In refusing to tell the company every
physician and practitioner whom he had consulted or
been treated by within the past five years, the decedent deprived the company of valuable underwriting
information regarding his mental state, and in doing
so committed fraud and misrepresentation. If insurance companies are required to stand behind risks on
whom they can obtain no information and who withhold valuable information, then they soon will be able
to accept no risks at all.
Therefore, the only question which the court had
to decide below is whether or not a jury might reasonably conclude from the evidence that Dr. Burnham's
failure to disclose the foregoing information would
be material either to the "acceptance of the risk or
the hazard assumed by the insurer." Utah Code Annotated, Section 31-19-8 (1953). Itis submitted that
no jury of reasonable men could reach a verdict saying that failure of the decedent to inform the insurance company of 80 psychiatric visits (during which
time he made statements suicidal in nature) was not
material when the decedent later commftted suicide.
They could only find that such information was vital
to company acceptance of the risk. The question then
23

was a legal one, and was properly decided by the lower court.
The final point made by the Appellant is that
Question No. 6 is within itself ambiguous. Respondent submits that nothing could be more clear than
requiring an applicant to
every physician or
practitioner whom you have consulted or who has
treated you during the past five years." Every means
every, and that includes psychiatrists. Question No.
6 may require an extensive list of physicians, but that
is its only fault. It is not ambiguous.
Therefore, in that there was no question presented upon which reasonable men could disagree,
the trial court was completely justified in granting
the summary judgment for defendant, Bankers Life
& Casualty Company .
POINT IV
DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO A SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.

Appellant in the final point of her brief reiterates more exhaustively points handled in the first
point of her brief. The fraud issue has been exhaustively discussed and answered, and further analysis
is unnecessary. However, it may be helpful to the
court to further analyze the Appellant's contention
that the court erred in concluding that the suicide
clause could be reinstated upon reinstatement of the
policy.
Citing Williston on Contracts, the Appellant
contends that the weight of authority holds that re24

instatement of an insurance policy does not begin
anew ithe period of a suicide clause, and then argues
that the provision of Utah Code Annotated, Section
31-22-18, ( 1953), excludes the suicide clause and that
even ff the suicide clause were reinstated (since in
Utah reinstatement is a continuation of the original
contract) the suicide clause two year limitation has
still expired since it is part of the original contract.
Appellant further argues that when Sections 31-2215 and 31-22-18, Utah Code Annotated (1953) are
read together silicide is not one of the exclusions covered under Section 31-22-18.
Utah Code Annotated ( 1953) , Sections 31-22-15
and 31-22-18, provide:
"31-22-15. Suicide. - From and after the
effective date of this act, the suicide of a policyholder after the second policy year of any
policy written by any life insurance company
doing business in this state shall not be a defense against the payment of a life insurance
policy, whether such suicide was voluntary or
involuntary and whether such policyholder
was sane or insane; provided, that 'this section
shall not apply to policies insuring against
death by accident only, nor to the accident or
double indemnity provisions of an insurance
policy."
"31-22-18. Reinstated life insurance policy or annunity contract. - ( 1) A reinstated
policy of life insurance or annuity contraet
may 'be contested on account of fraud or misrepresentation of facts material to the rein'."
statement only for the same period following
reinstatement and with the same conditions
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and exceptions as the policy provides with respect to contestability after original issuance.
( 2) When any life insurance policy or annuity contract is reinstated, such reinstated
policy or contract may exclude or restrict liability to the same extent that such liability
could have been or was excluded or restricted
when the policy or contract was originally issued, and such exclusion or restriction shall be
effective from the date of reinstatement."
The obvious failing of treatise law i.e. Williston,
is that it is persuasive only, and when confronted by
a statute such as Section 31-22-18, Utah Code Annotated ( 1953) it has little value. Even a cursory examination of the two statutes mentioned above clearly indicates that the suicide provision (Section 31-2215, Utah Code Annotated ( 1953)) refers to suicide
clauses in policies continued without lapse. Reflection
of that policy is obvious in that had the drafters of the
statute wished to exclude suicide clauses they would
have made Section 31-22-18, Utah Code Annotated
( 1953) subject to that exception. They did not choose
to do so but rather made the language all inclusive.
An analysis of the policy behind the suicide
clause (which is a standard insurance policy provision) may be helpful in bringing understanding to
the statute here in question.
The most obvious reason 'for insurance companies to include the standard 'two year suicide clause is
to prevent applicants 'from buying insurance, intend26

ing to commit suicide, thereby increasing the risk factor and obliterating underwriting percentages.
In light of that policy it would seem absured to
allow insurers to put such a clause in the original
policy, let the insured lapse the policy and then force
the insurer to pick up the risk on reinstatement when
the insured reinstates contemplating suicide. The
company necessarily needs the right to reinstate the
policy subject to a new two year suicide period to protect itself against reinstatements contemplating suicide. The reasons behind such reinstatement protections are the same as those in the original policy.
Utah law, as pointed out by the District Court below,
recognizes the above policy considerations and drafted Section 31-22-18, Utah Code Annotated 1953 to
meet that policy. 'The only logical conclusion therefore is that suicide clauses were intended to be included in the reinstated policies and that the two year
period was to begin anew at the option of the insurer.
It would not be illogical to argue that the suicide
clause may have been the primary reason for the all
inclusive language of Section 31-22-18, Utah Code
Annotated ( 1953).
The lower court, recognizing the impact of
Section 31-22-18, chose to refer to the statute in
s'trengthening its Memorandum Decision regarding
material misrepresentation. It noted in the Memorandum Decision that Bankers Life & Casualty Company had a right to reinstate the policy under the
conditions set out in Section 31-22-18 had it chosen
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to do so. The court commented that the disclosure by
the insured of the visits to Dr. Fowler would have enabled the insurance company to evaluate information
obtained from Dr. Fowler and decided whether or not
to insert again the two year contestability restriction
in connection with death due to suicide as well as to
conclude that the risk was either acceptable or unacceptable. The lower court's analysis of the insurance
company's power and position was accurate and representative of the intent of the framers of Section
31-22-18.
Therefore, there was no error created by the lower court substantiating and illustrating its holding
of material misrepresentation by referring to the
authority under Section 31-22-18 to reinstate the suicide clause of the original policy with a new 'time period.
Defendant, therefore, was clearly entitled to a
Summary Judgment as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
The District Court below had only one question
to decide: whether or not a jury might reasonably
conclude from the evidence that Dr. Preston J. Burnham's failure to disclose 80 visits to Dr. Herbert B.
Fowler in his professional capacity as a psychiatrist
would be material either to the acceptance of the risk
or the hazard assumed by the insurer. The issue was
one of law for the court, and it properly granted a
summary judgment on that issue as outlined in its
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Memorandum Decision. The Affidavit presented by
the defendant was timely and sufficient under Rule
56 (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and that
Affidavit combined with the pleadings and depositions on file illustrated conclusively that there were
no material issues of fact which should have been suhmi tted to the jury. Defendant was,
entitled
to a summary judgment as a matter of law and respondent respectfully requests an affjrmance of the
District Court's decision below.
HANSON & GARRETT
DON J. HANSON
520 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 .
Attorneys for Respondent
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